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Manufactured Housing Finance 




anufactured housing, or mobile homes, is often the most attractive housing 
option  for  many  low-  and  moderate-income  Americans.  Reinforcing  the 
concept that it is expensive to be poor, the financing of manufactured housing 
is often much more expensive than it needs to be. This article reviews how 
the current financing for manufactured homes functions, explores why it is so expensive, 
and suggests an important strategy to reduce its costs by pursuing a secondary market for 
manufactured home mortgages.
The benefits to low- and moderate-income home owners of a more efficient manufactured 
home mortgage market would be substantial, for as many as 10 million families live in manu-
factured homes. Many are low-income families, the group for whom home ownership is one 
of the only sources of wealth and financial stability. Indeed, manufactured housing is a key 
resource when it comes to providing home-ownership opportunities for low- and moderate-
income families, accounting for two-thirds of this country’s new affordable housing produc-
tion in recent years. 
There are many obstacles to creating this more efficient mortgage market, but that was 
also once true for site-built homes when credit was expensive and home-ownership rates were 
low. Over the past fifty years, however, the U.S. mortgage market has created ample capital 
flows and continued product innovation that have contributed to a home-ownership rate 
over 70 percent and a climate—unique in the international context—in which an 80 percent 
loan-to-value, thirty-year mortgage is considered “plain vanilla.” The following explores how 
that same vibrancy can spread to the manufactured housing market.
Current Financing of Manufactured Housing Is Expensive
Although most families who live in manufactured housing consider themselves home 
owners like any other, the process by which they purchase and finance their home is radi-
cally different. This contradiction, in part, is a relic of the manufactured housing industry’s 
origins in the travel-trailer industry of the 1940s and 1950s. The technology used to produce 
manufactured homes has evolved in leaps and bounds, resulting in a product that today can 
be virtually indistinguishable from site-built construction. But even though a manufactured 
1   William Apgar, Allegra Calder, Michael Collins, and Mark Duda, “An Examination of Manufactured Housing 
as a Community- and Asset-Building Strategy,” Report to the Ford Foundation by the Neighborhood Reinvestment 
Corporation in collaboration with the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, September 2002, 
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home today bears no resemblance to a “trailer,” it is still all too frequently sold and financed 
like one.
The trailer-inspired sales and finance system imposes unnecessary costs on owners of 
manufactured homes. For example, most manufactured homes are titled as personal property 
and consequently their financing is handled through personal property—or “chattel”—loans 
rather than normal real estate mortgages. Consider data provided by two different lenders 
who deal predominantly in manufactured home chattel loans. Don Glisson Jr. of Triad Finan-
cial noted that his loans start at 7 percent, but only 20 percent to 25 percent of customers 
receive this rate. Others pay up to 10.5 percent, which is reserved for those with the lowest 
credit scores who are borrowing on a single-wide unit. David Rand of Origen Financial noted 
that his average was 9.5 percent with a range of 7.5 percent to 15 percent. 
The  prevalence  of  chattel  loans  tends  to  push  up  the  finance  costs  for  the  average 
borrower. The Affordable Housing Survey shows that manufactured homes on rented land 
have median terms of 9 percent interest for 15 years (or 8.7 percent interest for 18 years if on 
owned land), compared to median terms of 7.5 percent interest over 25 years for single-family 
site-built homes. 
Although many manufactured home purchasers try to access the mortgage market as a way 
to get cheaper financing, they are rejected by lenders at a higher rate than homebuyers with 
similar credit scores who purchase site-built homes. Manufactured housing mortgage purchase 
applications were rejected 30 percent more often than applicants for site-built houses at every 
level of income (see Figure 1), according to 2004 lender data reported in compliance with the 
Home  Mortgage  Disclosure 
Act  of  1975  (HMDA).  In 
fact,  people  well  above  the 
median income are rejected 
for  manufactured  housing 
mortgage  loans  at  much 
higher  percentages  than 
those  with  incomes  below 
the  median  who  apply  for 
site-built home mortgages.
         
                         
2   Ibid., 12. 
3    HMDA data is available at the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council  website:  http://www.ffiec.
gov/hmda/.
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Finally, for those customers who are able 
to secure a conventional (non-chattel) mort-
gage, the loan is more expensive than site-
built home loans. Specifically, more than 
50 percent of manufactured housing loans 
are made at rates that are three percentage 
points higher than Treasury rates, while only 
11 percent of site-built home mortgages are 
made at these higher rates (see Figure 2). 
Current Obstacles to an Efficient  
Mortgage Market
Many aspects of the current market for 
manufactured homes make them difficult 
candidates  for  long-term,  conventional 
mortgages,  including  how  they  are  sold, 
sited, titled, and appraised. 
Dealers
Most new manufactured homes are sold through dealers. In many instances, dealers steer 
buyers into the personal property loan route because those loans are fast and simple, even 
though they are more expensive. Moreover, loans are often referrals from dealer to lenders, 
where the dealer captures a fee—sometimes a percentage of total financing—in return for the 
referral. These fees can come as direct transfers, bonuses for pushing particular products, or 
bonuses based on the performance of the loan. Finally, some dealers aggressively try to steer 
purchasers to their own financing program, which often is less competitive than a home 
mortgage.
In addition to pushing more expensive financing options, some dealers also create confu-
sion around the price of a manufactured home. The practice of pricing a manufactured home 
varies from state to state. In California, dealers are required by law to display the Manu-
facturer’s Suggested Retail Price (MSRP). The MSRP information includes invoice price, 
recommended dealer markup, and the home’s specifications. This allows consumers (those 
shopping dealers’ lots, as opposed to those buying a home that has already been affixed to 
real property), to make apple-to-apple comparisons between different models and dealers. 
In many states, however, this is not yet standard practice. Although many lenders demand 
invoice information for a personal property, or chattel loan, consumers are often in the dark 
on their home’s true price. 
High dealer markups lead home buyers to take a bigger loan to cover the higher price 
that results from the markup, reducing the amount of home equity achieved through their 
down payment. This also raises the loan-to-invoice ratio, which increases the interest-rate 
lenders charge. In the conventional mortgage market, there are several safeguards to protect 
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borrowers, but there is very little supervision of predatory lending practices with personal 
property loans. Not all manufactured housing loans are governed by the Real Estate and 
Settlement Procedures Act, the Truth in Lending Act, or the Home Ownership and Equity 
Protection Act, for example, which protect borrowers from abusive or nontransparent prac-
tices, including exorbitant costs and kickbacks.
Manufactured home sellers who put a premium on the home buyers’ utility could set 
better examples for the existing dealer network. For example, CFED’s Innovations in Manu-
factured Homes (I’M HOME) initiative supports nonprofit affordable housing developers 
that are placing high-quality, affordable manufactured homes in communities around the 
country and selling them directly to home buyers. Potterhill Homes of Cincinnati is a leading 
example of a for-profit developer that also works directly with homebuyers, allowing them 
to bypass the dealer network. Bringing responsible dealers and developers, whether for-profit 
or nonprofit, into the sector will contribute to setting new standards for fair, efficient, and 
equitable treatment of consumers. It also, in many cases, brings consumers directly into the 
pipeline for traditional mortgages.
Flight Risk: How Mobile Is a Mobile Home?
Once a customer buys a manufactured home from a dealer, he or she will site the home 
on a lot that could be either owned or leased. Even though many manufactured homes are 
sited on leased land, they are rarely moved—by one estimate, as little as one percent are ever 
moved. In part, this is explained by the cost of moving and the limited options of where to 
go: “relocating a ‘mobile’ home costs $1,500 to $5,000, and most parks won’t take one more 
than ten years old,” according to a Ford Foundation report. 
Manufactured homes are also increasingly likely to be placed on privately owned land 
rather than leased lots. Yet these homes, even when permanently affixed to land to which 
the home owner has fee simple or cooperative ownership, are essentially still treated like 
travel trailers by some lenders. This phenomenon is explained, in part, by a Catch-22 situa-
tion where you cannot title a home as real estate until you attach it to the ground, but you 
cannot attach it to the ground until you buy and transport it home.
4   Similarly, the entrance of major banks into the manufactured housing mortgage market holds potential to 
improve competition, standards, and practices, which in turn would make manufactured housing mortgages more 
enticing to a secondary market. More mainstream mortgage lending would also bring greater consumer protection 
to the manufactured housing market.
5   Allan Wallis, “Manufactured Housing,” in Encyclopedia of Housing, ed. Willem van Vliet, 347–51 (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998).
6   Kevin Krajick, “The American Dream on Wheels,” Ford Foundation Report, Spring 2003. http://www.ford-
found.org/publications/ff_report/view_ff_report_detail.cfm?report_index=392.
7   CFED, 2005. http://www.cfed.org/focus.m?parentid=317&siteid=317&id=581.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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The Problems with Title and the Importance of Owning the Asset as Real Estate
Title to manufactured homes is also complicated. Nearly one-third of manufactured 
homes are titled as real estate, with the vast majority being titled instead as a car or boat 
would be: as personal property.  In more than 40 states, it is possible to convert the title of 
the manufactured home from personal to real property (in many cases the central require-
ment is that the home is affixed to a permanent foundation).  Yet the numbers themselves 
indicate that home owners are not pursuing this option. It is unclear whether this is because 
of a lack of information during the purchasing and financing process, or because of the 
complexity of the titling process. 
While the reasons that most manufactured homes never get converted to real property 
may vary from case to case and state to state, the way in which the home is titled will 
consistently influence the home owner’s financing options. Homes that are titled as personal 
property rather than real estate will qualify only for personal property financing or noncon-
forming mortgage financing. Both types of financing are more expensive than standard 
conforming mortgages. 
Appraisals, Value, and the Resale Market
A final consideration that complicates the manufactured housing market is the current 
process of valuation and appraisals. Appraisers used to dealing with site-built housing are 
often at a loss as to how to fairly appraise manufactured homes. Guidelines such as Fannie 
Mae’s requirement that two out of three comparable sales used for the appraisal be manu-
factured homes may further confuse things, particularly when manufactured housing is used 
for infill development alongside site-built homes.0 Steve Hullibarger, industry consultant, 
notes that “the low number of HUD code homes in many urban locales makes it tough or 
impossible to locate manufactured housing comps to satisfy the Fannie Mae requirement.” 
Efforts to train appraisers on modern manufactured housing do exist, such as a partnership 
between the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) and the Appraisal Institute. Appraisals 
without solid backing affect both new and existing homes, increasing the general uncertainty 
of the resale market for manufactured housing.
For asset-building strategies to provide low- and moderate-income families with a mean-
ingful path to financial security, families must be able to acquire assets, preserve or grow 
their value over time, and eventually realize the accumulated value of that asset. George 
McCarthy, program officer at the Ford Foundation, refers to these three elements as the 
“asset-building trinity.”  Yet the constrained resale market for manufactured housing is the 
weakest part of this market’s “trinity.” Owners of these homes cannot simply assume that 
8   Ronald A. Wirtz, “Home, sweet (manufactured?) home,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Fedgazzette, 
July 2005. http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/fedgaz/05-07/cover.cfm.
9   Cathy Atkins, “Manufactured Housing: Not What You Think,” National Conference of State Legislatures, 
January 2006, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/econ/housing/manufacturedhousing.html.
10   Fannie Mae Announcement 03-06, June 3, 2003.  “Mortgage Eligibility and Servicing Procedures for Mortgages 
Secured by Manufactured Homes,” 9.  http://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2003/03-06.pdf.
11   Steve Hullibarger Interview, February 2, 2006.
12   George McCarthy Interview, February 3, 2006.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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their investment will result in a nest egg when they are ready to sell, in part because financing 
options for existing manufactured homes are scarce. Fannie Mae’s standards, for example, 
do not allow the purchase of mortgages on anything but new manufactured homes. This 
limitation severely curtails capital for the sale of existing manufactured homes. Inasmuch 
as the lack of a resale market limits the collateral value of manufactured homes, a vicious 
cycle is created. The lack of credit available for purchase of existing manufactured homes 
severely restricts the pool of potential buyers. Fewer buyers who are willing and able to buy 
an existing home means lower collateral value: as demand shrinks, lenders’ perception of 
risk—for both new and existing manufactured housing—grows. After all, what would happen 
if the home owner needs to sell before the loan is paid off?
Making  the  Manufactured  Home  Market  More  Like  the  Site-built  Home  Market:   
A Promising Example
The Ford Foundation and the New Hampshire Community Loan Fund (NHCLF) are 
proving that a home financing system that mimics the single-family, site-built home mort-
gage market can work for manufactured housing. Ford provided $3 million in low-interest 
capital to help NHCLF originate retail mortgage lending services to residents of the 78 
manufactured housing parks that it has helped to convert to resident ownership. NHCLF 
makes mortgage loans for new home acquisition, purchase of existing homes, refinance, and 
repair to borrowers at rates between 8 percent to 9 percent for up to 25 years. NHCLF also 
provides first-time home buyers access to state Housing Finance Authority loans at 6 percent 
interest over 30 years. The Loan Fund has also been successful in selling mortgages to CRA-
motivated lenders. This is a crucial point, given that the development of a vibrant secondary 
market for manufactured housing loans is one of many obstacles that must be overcome 
before it is possible to realize the potential savings for the millions of low- and moderate-
income families that own manufactured homes. 
Toward a Secondary Market for Manufactured Housing Mortgages
Overview
Securitization is “a process of packaging individual loans and other debt instruments, 
converting the package into a security or securities, and possibly enhancing their credit status 
or rating to further their sale to third-party investors.” The key purpose in securitizing loans 
is to move from illiquid loans to liquid investment vehicles. This makes raising capital easier 
for lenders and, in turn, allows them to lend at lower rates. This also provides more available 
funding and a variety of credit forms for consumers. For the loan originator, securitization 
allows for the turnover of capital more quickly and for increased profits. Investors receive 
more options for diversification, profit possibilities from trading, liquidity, and yields based 
on rated levels for risk. Finally, investment banks have opportunities for new products, and 
for trading volume and profits.
13    Kendall,  Leon  T.  and  Fishman,  Michael  J.  eds,  A  Primer  on  Securitization  (Cambridge  Mass.: 
The MIT Press, 1996), 1-2.
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The process of securitization begins with a lender making loans that it continues to 
service as protection against default. These loans are purchased by a trust that issues securi-
ties that are protected by the underlying collateral. These loans are then rated by credit-rating 
agencies; they receive the highest rating if they are backed by the full faith and credit of the 
U.S. government, or with the highly regarded credit backing of a Government Sponsored 
Enterprise (GSE). This rating provides investors with a heuristic to measure the worthiness 
of the loan and decide what level of risk they are willing to take for a given yield—as well as 
indicate how easily they can resell the security. If a loan does not merit the desired credit 
rating on its face, credit enhancements such as a letter of credit or a bank insurance policy, 
as well as use of subordinated debt, reserves, or overcollateralization, can work to enhance 
investor confidence.
GSEs
For the site-built market, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are the chief actors who purchase 
loans from lenders and package them as securities that can be sold to investors. As a result 
of the above risk and perceptions of risk, investors and the GSEs, such as Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, have been reluctant to get more involved in the manufactured home market 
where they suffered significant losses in the recent past. Yet the losses they suffered were the 
result of an “easy credit” boom, which has now passed and from which the entire industry 
has learned major lessons. 
As a result, GSE involvement is almost nonexistent in manufactured housing. Typically, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not buy chattel loans, and though the properties that are 
titled as real estate can be purchased by the GSEs as manufactured housing mortgage-backed 
securities (MH MBS), less than half of one percent of Fannie Mae’s holdings are manufac-
tured housing loans.
In addition, Fannie Mae buys only a very small subset of manufactured home mort-
gages that have specific characteristics. In order for Fannie Mae to purchase a manufactured 
housing loan, the home must meet HUD-dictated building standards, be classified as real 
property, be on owned land or cooperatively owned land, meet specific space requirements, 
be attached to a permanent foundation, be on a public or community owned street, have 
permanently connected utilities, and have all improvements fully paid.
Data that do exist often reflect the worst of the market. For example, Fannie Mae charges a 
50 basis point risk premium on manufactured housing loans based on the poor performance 
of their manufactured home mortgages acquired from their takeover of a failed chattel lender. 
Even though this data set does not represent the full spectrum of manufactured housing loan 
performance, Fannie Mae’s policies compromise the entire marketplace. According to Steve 
Hullibarger, Fannie’s policies “have really chilled the market and spooked many developers 
15   Ibid, 2–6.
16   Ronald A. Wirtz, “Ginnie Mae I buy a Manufactured Home?” Fedgazzette, July 2005, http://minneapolisfed.
org/pubs/fedgaz/05-07/buy.cfm
17   Fannie Mae Announcement 03-06, June 3, 2003 (see footnote 9).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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into either using more expensive modular homes or simply backing off [from manufactured 
housing] entirely.”
While Michael Collins of Policylab Consulting believes that “Fannie and Freddie have 
to do it first to get the bigger lenders into the market, while also playing some retraining 
role to help lenders to understand the market,” others look outside the GSEs for secondary 
market options. As McCarthy points out, “The GSEs now buy less than 50 percent of site-
built loans—Citibank, Chase, and others are getting as big or bigger than Fannie or Freddie. 
Citibank is trying to decide if manufactured housing is enough of an emerging market to get 
into.”0 
Collateral Risk
One significant challenge to creating a secondary market for manufactured housing mort-
gages is understanding the value of the underlying asset. In other words, does manufactured 
housing appreciate or depreciate, and by how much under different circumstances? Part of the 
problem in answering this question is the recent turmoil in the manufactured housing market. 
  The  manufactured  housing  and  chattel  lending  industries  have  experienced  remark-
able upheaval since the mid-1990s. During a phase of solid performance up to the mid-
1990s, industry expert Martin Lavin explained that there was a period of “free-wheeling 
retail lending terms, when many long-time industry loan provisions were discarded.”  Such 
relaxed underwriting soon led to a performance crisis in the chattel lending industry, ulti-
mately culminating in the highly publicized bankruptcy of lender Conseco (formerly Green 
Tree Financial) in December 2002. While Conseco may have generated the most headlines 
in the mainstream media, it was not the only casualty. Lavin estimates that by 2000, when 
the “asset backed securities . . . bomb detonated . . . about two-thirds of the lenders had 
perished.” Home shipments also dropped precipitously as failed loans flooded the industry 
with excess product in the form of repossessed homes. 
The assumption that a manufactured home does not appreciate like a “regular” home 
is deeply ingrained in the public’s consciousness. There are proponents of this view within 
the industry itself: David Rand of Origen asserts, “We still have a depreciating asset. When 
you map out the amortization curve on one of these units over thirty years, the customer is 
under water.” This assessment may reflect the market as it is—with many imperfections and 
irresponsible lending practices—rather than the market as it could be if it had better rules and 
products. It most likely does not reflect quality of construction, which has risen dramatically 
over the years to the point where MHI estimates that manufactured housing’s life expectancy 
today approximates that of comparable site-built housing. 
18    Steve Hullibarger Interview, February 2, 2006.
19   Michael Collins Interview, February 1, 2006.
20   George McCarthy Interview, February 3, 2006.
21   Martin V. Lavin, “Chattel Lending Today: Is It Dead or Alive?” MHI, Modern Homes, November–December 
2004, 13–15. http://www.martylavin.com/writings/Feat-Chattel%20Today.pdf. 
22   Martin V. Lavin, “It’s the Affordability, Stupid,” Manufactured Home Merchandiser, March 2002, 1–3. Available 
online at http://www.martylavin.com/writings/its-the-affordability-stupid.pdf, accessed March 31, 2006. 
23   David Rand Interview, February 7, 2006.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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There is a small but growing body 
of data that suggests that manufactured 
housing  appreciates  under  the  right 
circumstances.  Consumers  Union, 
for  example,  analyzed  manufactured 
housing data and found that “average 
appreciation  rates  of  manufactured 
homes packaged with owned land are 
statistically in line with the site-built 
market” (emphasis added). However, 
the Consumers Union study did find 
that there is a wider variation in appre-
ciation and depreciation of manufac-
tured housing than site-built housing, 
as  illustrated  in  Figure  3.  The  fact 
that more manufactured housing units 
depreciate  tends  to  lead  people  to 
assume that most, if not all, of these 
units depreciate.
  NHCLF  has  accumulated  anec-
dotal evidence that homes in resident-
owned communities appreciate faster 
than those in land-lease communities. 
The organization is now working with 
the University of New Hampshire to 
track appreciation more generally. 
  The experience of California, the first state to prohibit zoning restrictions based solely 
upon construction method, is instructive as well. For nearly 25 years, industry consultant 
Steve Hullibarger has maintained a database of more than 1,500 manufactured homes on 
infill lots that have been converted to real property. Appreciation rates of the more than 
500 of these homes that changed hands during this period track similarly to surrounding 
site-built homes. Finally, both MHI and HUD’s Partnership for Advanced Technology 
in Housing (PATH) review academic studies that suggest that manufactured homes, when 
architecturally compatible to their neighborhoods and affixed on permanent foundations, 
can appreciate. 0
24   Kevin Jewell, “Manufactured Housing Appreciation: Stereotypes and Data,” Consumers Union (April 2003).   
http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/mh/Appreciation.pdf.
25   Ibid.  This is also true generally for cheaper housing, whether it is manufactured or site built.
26   This graph in the Consumer Union source (see note 24) is based on data from the American Housing Survey.   
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs.html
27   Paul Bradley Interview, February 2, 2006.
28   Steve Hullibarger Interview, February 2, 2006.
29    Manufactured  Housing  Institute.  http://www.manufacturedhousing.org/lib/showtemp_detail01.
asp?id=129&cat=3. 
30   Stephen Winter Associates, “A Community Guide to Factory-Built Housing,” September 2001.  http://www.
huduser.org/publications/destech/factbuilt.html. 
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Default Risk
Researchers at the University of North Carolina found that controlling for everything 
but manufactured housing status (though analyzing refinancing loans), the odds of default 
are only 11 percent higher, while prepayment risk is 43 percent less that of site-built home 
mortgages. This means that, while it is somewhat more likely that a manufactured home 
loan will go into default, it is far less likely that the borrower will prepay.  In the end, these 
risks do not seem to explain the much higher interest rates for manufactured housing over 
site-built housing. 
Strategies to Reduce Risk
Risk, or perceived risk, to investors of manufactured home mortgage securities currently 
impedes a functioning secondary market. Risk can be reduced through the following credit 
enhancing strategies: 
Subordinated Debt and Overcollateralization
One way to make manufactured home mortgages more attractive to both lenders, and 
ultimately secondary market investors, would be to borrow a strategy used by the New 
Hampshire Community Loan Fund (NHCLF) for co-op conversion loans for residents to 
purchase their mobile home parks.  “The key strategy,” according to Andrea Levere, president 
of CFED, “is to bring in Community Development Financial Institutions to provide subor-
dinated debt to back up the first mortgage.”  This approach of sorting out the debt, with a 
senior piece that is less risky, has been a very successful strategy for NHCLF.  “That’s how 
New Hampshire built its whole market,” Levere said. Over time, as conventional lenders get 
more comfortable with the loan product, “then the subordinated debt can get smaller and 
smaller.” 
The same strategy could be employed at the individual mortgage level.  In this case, 
you could have a first mortgage that was relatively small compared to the value of the 
collateral (the manufactured home).  This approach would accomplish two objectives: (1) 
make lenders more comfortable with making manufactured home loans; and (2) create 
a type of loan that would be attractive to investors after it was pooled and securitized.   
In this case, you might have a CDFI, philanthropy, government agency, or some other 
socially-motivated lender make the subordinated second loan on the manufactured home. 
31   “The Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on Subprime Foreclosures,” in The Special Case of Prepayment Penalties 
and Balloon Payments, ed. Roberto G. Quercia, Michael A. Stegman, and Walter R. Davis, Center for Community 
Capitalism, Kenan Institute for Private Enterprise, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, January 25, 2005.
32    Prepayment risk is generally of greater concern to lenders because it is unpredictable and cannot be mitigated; 
whereas default risk can be controlled by insurance.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Insurance
Mortgage insurance could play some role in supporting a secondary market for this 
industry. This type of policy exists for other “risky” or small-scale loans. The Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) provides mortgage insurance for loans with as little as three percent 
down, which vary from plain vanilla mortgages to mortgages that have rehabilitation built 
into them. FHA will provide insurance for single-family houses, houses with two to four 
units, condominium units, and houses needing rehabilitation under its 203(b) and 203(k) 
programs. In the case of default, following foreclosure the lender can be reimbursed for the 
unpaid portion of the loan after filing an insurance claim with HUD. If this policy were 
extended to manufactured housing, lenders would be able to loan with more confidence—
reducing rates and making the loans much more attractive to secondary market investors. 
Beyond FHA and HUD, mission-driven organizations could provide low-cost insurance in 
pursuit of meeting their goals.  On the for-profit side, private insurance could also be used 
to reduce the risk of these loans. 
Guarantees
Guarantees in the primary sense exist through mortgage insurance programs described 
above; however, guarantees could also be useful on the secondary market side. The Govern-
ment National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) provides a guarantee of interest and 
principal payment to secondary market investors for all loans insured by the variety of 
government agencies discussed above that are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. 
government. This is in pursuit of its mission “to expand affordable housing in America by 
linking global capital markets to the nation’s housing markets.” 
Ginnie Mae’s guarantee extends to manufactured housing; however, under its current 
guidelines, most manufactured housing loans do not meet eligibility criteria. Among other 
requirements, the loan must be insured by FHA (the Title 1 program) or the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA), and interest rates for a given pool of loans must be within 1.5 percent 
of each other. According to HMDA data, less than 17 percent of all manufactured housing 
mortgages (this is excluding personal property loans) approved in 2004 were approved under 
Title 1 or by the VA, and the sheer amount of interest-rate variation in manufactured housing 
loans due to the lending practices described in the previous section disqualify most mort-
gages. Loosening these requirements, and exploring ways for Ginnie’s secondary market 
guarantee to extend to a greater portion of manufactured housing loans, would do much to 
interest secondary market investors.
33   Federal Citizen Information Center, “Guide to Single Family Home Mortgage Insurance”), February, 2005. 
http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/cic_text/housing/home-insure/mortgage.htm#how.
34   Ginnie Mae, “About Ginnie Mae,” http://www.ginniemae.gov/about/mission.asp?subTitle=About.
35   Ginnie Mae, “Chapter 30: Manufactured Home Loan Pools and Loan Packages—Special Requirements,” 
Ginnie Mae 5500.3, Rev. 1 30-1, (July 2003). http://www.ginniemae.gov/guide/pdf/chap30.pdf.
36   Housing Mortgage Disclosure Act National Aggregates, Tables A-1 and A-2, Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council 2004. http://www.ffiec.gov/hmdaadwebreport/NatAggWelcome.aspxFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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The same holds for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As publicly traded entities, they have 
the freedom to pursue many types of mortgages, but their guarantees are backed by their own 
credit, not that of the U.S. government. However, credit markets rate their paper with the 
highest confidence—in large part because some believe there is an implied guarantee by the 
government. Yet even though manufactured home sales can be as high as 20 percent of all 
new homes in a year, Fannie and Freddie’s manufactured housing holdings are less than half 
of one percent of their total holdings. 
It is in the interest of many agencies and mission-driven organizations to increase the 
stock  of  affordable  housing.  To  this  end,  an  individual  manufactured  home  guarantee 
program could be created with funding across agencies, or it could be created within one 
of these agencies. Further, any investor or foundation with the financial wherewithal could 
endow such a guarantee program. 
Reserves
Another approach to this problem would be to capture the entire surplus that is currently 
going to dealers and lenders and find a way to funnel that money (or a portion of it) into 
reserves that make manufactured housing mortgages less risky. For example, tens of thou-
sands of borrowers currently pay 14 percent on their loans; imagine what one could do to 
make loans less risky with the difference between that interest rate and an 8 percent mortgage?   
  This demonstrated willingness-to-pay by millions of consumers could be redirected to 
reserves that would be used as a reserve account for the trust that issued the securities. The 
reserves would be subordinated to all other interests and could be released over time after the 
underlying collateral hit specified performance targets. The freed-up financial reserves might 
fund deferred maintenance, or park upkeep (in the case of a co-op ownership), or be released 
back to the borrower.
How to Pay
The many types of credit enhancements explained above are expensive but provide a 
significant bang for the buck. One policy consideration would be to analyze how existing 
government housing programs (Community Development Block Grants, LIHTC, NMTC, 
HOME funds) might fund credit enhancement for manufactured home mortgages.  Other 
sources of financing that should be explored are the proposed Single-Family Affordable 
Home Housing Tax Credit or the American Dream Downpayment Fund.
Conclusion
In a world where only one-third of all manufactured homes are titled as real estate, there 
is clearly a long way to go before there is a vibrant mortgage market, much less one that 
benefits from the liquidity and lower borrowing costs that a secondary market can generate. 
But the potential benefit—both to the borrower and the financial industry—is spectacular. It 
is hard to overestimate the impact that low-cost mortgages for manufactured homes could FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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have. This new efficient financial system could create new markets for mortgage lenders and 
Wall Street firms; develop a new affordable housing tool for CDCs and local governments; 
and provide banks with a new CRA-qualified lending product (and investment, if EQ2s or 
Community Development Venture Capital were used as credit enhancements).  Most impor-
tantly, however, it would promote asset creation, pride, and the dignity of home ownership 
for millions of low-income American families.
Perceptions that manufactured housing is an innately risky housing stock, along with 
market imperfections in both the for-sale and resale markets, create formidable barriers for 
lenders. Yet it is worth distinguishing between unacceptably high risk and unfamiliar risk. 
Michael Collins believes “once you get the lenders over their stereotypes, they’d be more 
than willing to enter the market. The biggest issue is not the product, but the lack of educa-
tion. A lot of people got burned in the 1980s and early 1990s. Others just don’t know and 
are going on stereotypes and assumptions.” In this sense, all the players necessary to stimu-
late the growth of a healthy mortgage market for manufactured housing – lenders, GSEs, 
mortgage insurers, and other investors – need to feel that they are not taking on unknow-
able, unmanageable risks by entering this market. And what does that take? In the site-built 
market, such confidence is based on familiarity with the product, market data, accurate valu-
ation of collateral, and confidence in a thriving resale market. 
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